The current system of Congressional representation is dysfunctional. As of August 2022, only 22% of the American public approve of Congress, and with good reason. The method of Congressional election alone is problematic—our electoral system fails to protect minorities and some states receive more representatives proportional to their population than others. Politicians and professors alike are advocating for reform. In this paper, I propose a new system of governance with proportional representation, House expansion, and larger districts, and compare it to present and alternative systems.
States ought to ditch their majoritarian voting systems for proportional representation (PR), to increase voter turnout and protect minority voters. PR refers to an electoral system where subgroups of an electorate are reflected proportionately in the elected body, while, in the current majoritarian system, the ‘winner takes all.’ In the early 20th century, it was not unusual for parties to win 90% of city council seats with only 55% of votes (Amy). For instance, in North Carolina’s 1920 election, Democrats won only 4/7 of all votes, yet, by securing a majority in each district, elected all 10 congressmen (Douglas, 7). Proportional representation broke through these one-party monopolies and allowed for the fair representation of all political parties (Amy). In Cincinnati, elections that previously allowed Republicans with only 55% of votes to elect 97% of seats on the council, much more proportionally gave Republicans 33% of the seats for 28% of votes following the adoption of PR (Amy). The same majoritarian system issues are of concern today, as 11 of the seats up for election in 2022 were won by fewer than 10% last election, and 7 were by fewer than 5% (Ballotpedia). This is the first reason for PR: accurate representation of the populace. PR also facilitates minority parties’ access to government. Unless the district population size is unusually low (which this paper in subsequent paragraphs), political parties with even small percentages of votes would gain representation in the legislature, fulfilling democratic principles of inclusion, critical to stability in politically polarized societies like the U.S. today. This is essential, as the majorities in the various districts rarely offset each other evenly enough to give each party representation proportionate to its strength (Douglas 8). Additionally, even if unequal representation did even out, the representative of a victorious party in one district would not necessarily represent the views of the members of the same party in others. For example, the views of unrepresented Pennsylvania Democrats on labor questions would not necessarily be cared for by Democrats in the South (Douglas 8). Next, PR would decrease wasted votes, and thus encourage voting. When every vote makes a difference in the election outcome, voters perceive it more worth commuting to the polling booth at election time. Examining 15 Western European countries in the 1990s, IDEA found that youth turnout in countries using PR is nearly 20% higher than in non-PR countries (Miller 14). Fourth, PR would encourage parties to campaign beyond swing districts, as every vote will affect seats, even ones from areas where the party is electorally weak. Historical precedent further solidifies these claims for PR. In Western Europe, parliamentary PR systems score better with regard to governmental longevity, voter participation, and economic performance because switches in government between two ideologically polarized parties, as can happen in majoritarian systems, makes long-term economic and social planning more difficult, while broad PR coalition governments help engender stable decision making, allowing for national development.
Some prefer ranked choice voting (RCV), however, proportional representation is more simple and representative. RCV—under which voters rank candidates in order of preference—is an increasingly popular electoral system. However, RCV comes with a host of issues. First, voters can subtly manipulate election outcomes through the strategic placement of popular candidates. For example, if two candidates A and B are equally popular, but Bob strongly supports Candidate A, Bob can rank Candidate A first but Candidate B tenth, even if Candidate B was his second or even third choice, to give Candidate A a better shot in beating Candidate B. Essentially, RCV allows people to vote in ways which do not reflect their true attitudes. Additionally, RCV operates as more than one election and in doing so, affords some voters a greater opportunity to influence electoral outcomes. Voters whose choices are repeatedly eliminated effectively vote several times. In contrast, voters who rank a continuing candidate are stuck with a single choice—that single vote (Bryer). Many argue that RCV’s consequence of producing multiple elections is inconsequential. However, this is untrue. Due to its many elections, RCV can give equal value to a voter’s third-place candidate and another’s top choice. As a result, RCV elects representatives who are the first choice of a minority of voters. In the 2010 race for supervisor in San Francisco’s District 10: the winner received less than 12% of first-place votes, edging out the candidate with the most first-place votes. Similarly, the 49th mayor of Oakland won by 24% of first-choice votes, while her opponent had 34% (Bergerson). RCV’s nonmonotonicity tempts and forces voters to engage in electoral chicanery by ranking their favorite candidate second or third to avoid harming her in subsequent rounds of vote tabulation. In this way, RCV eliminates genuine binary choices, disenfranchising voters. Lastly, RCV increases overvoting error rates, where voters select more than one candidate in a single round of an RCV election (Bryer). When overvotes occur, the voter’s entire ballot is rendered null, decreasing the number of voters participating in any given election. With RCV, overvoting happens disproportionately to women and minority precincts. In this way, the RCV system actually decreases minority representation.
Next, the U.S. should increase the number of House representatives to more accurately represent voters. The House’s current size—435 representatives—had not changed since 1911, when the US population was ⅓ its current size; an increase in the size of the House is long overdue. The US ought to expand the House’s representative-to-population ratio proportional to the smallest state, Wyoming (Agruma). Firstly because representative-to-population ratios are unequal. Montana and Wyoming each have one representative, but Montana’s population is nearly twice Wyoming’s. Meanwhile, Rhode Island gets two seats with roughly the same population as Montana. These discrepancies violate the basic constitutional principle of one person one vote, causing voters to be unequally represented in the chamber designed to offset the Senate, where every state gets two seats regardless of population. Secondly, representatives are not reflecting the attitudes of their constituents. Studies find that representatives covering larger populations are more likely to take positions at odds with the majority of their constituents. Expanding the House would allow representatives to better connect with and reflect the nuanced political identity of their district (Cunningham). Third, the size of the House determines the shape of the Electoral College, because a state’s electoral votes are equal to its congressional delegation. Expanding the House would ensure that States already underrepresented in Congress have a strong say in their president and House representatives.
Lastly, larger districts, drawn by thoroughly vetted citizen representatives, would decrease the risk of gerrymandering and increase the accuracy of the PR electoral system. Larger—and thus fewer—districts would mean that those who draw the districts would have less opportunity to create districts that bias one political party. Independent redistricting commissions, composed of lottery-selected citizens, would further decrease the threat of gerrymandering. Polls reveal that Americans hold similar sentiments: over 60% of voters support the creation of independent redistricting commissions (IRCs) and 75% favor IRCs to the current system. Many states, including Idaho, Ohio, California, and Alaska, have already implemented a task force, and the United States at large must follow suit. Lastly, larger districts would increase the number of representatives per district, allowing smaller minority parties to have a more accurate number of representatives (CLC).
In all, proportional representation elections, expanding the House, and drawing larger districts will protect minorities and represent all voters, upholding the tenants of democracy, in ways that the current system does not. The United States ought to adopt this new electoral system.
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